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## Contribution of Indian and Non-Indian philosophers to the practice of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy

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### Abstract

The article aims at analyzing the not only India but also others countries influence on the development of philosophical thinking in particular of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. Philosophy can't be developed without the universe view of the philosopher. A world view is constructed by a philosopher over a period of time, out of direct experiences and reflections on the tradition. The paper focuses on the world aspect of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* concept of Indian Philosophy. Friedrich Max Muller was well aware of the Romantic roots of his own Indological interest. G.W.F. Hegel, the most powerful critic of Romantic nostalgia, represents a different and highly critical approach to Indian thought; yet, he is a keen and watchful observer and tries to deal philosophically with Indian philosophy. The classical period of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* in the 1<sup>st</sup> millennium A.D. is a period of constant conflict with Buddhist philosophy, but at the same time of a remarkable interplay and mediation of ideas. This specific relationship between *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and Buddhist Logic in several exemplary cases, been pronounced by Frauwallner and his disciples. However, in their most recent contributions only a somewhat casual attention is paid to the classical and ancient periods of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*. We explore the possibility of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* methodology being influenced by world arguing that the developed on its own approach.

**Keyword:** Ānvīkṣikī, Arthaśāstra, Aristotle, Diñnāga, Śaḍ-darśana, Schopenhauer

### 1. Introduction

Philosophy in its widest etymological means 'love of knowledge'. Aims at knowledge of truth it is termed in Indian literature, 'the vision of truth' <sup>[1]</sup>. Śaṅkarācārya, who is the author of the *Prapañcasāra* says that Lord constructed eighteen vidyās and all the darśanas <sup>[2]</sup>. The eighteen vidyās are *R̥g Veda*, *Yajur Veda*, *Sāma Veda*, *Atharva Veda*, *Śikṣā*, *Kalpa*, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Nirukta*, *Chandaḥ Śāstra*, *Jyotiḥ Śāstra*, *Purāṇa*, *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṃsā*, *Dharmaśāstra*, *Āyurveda*, *Dhanurveda*, *Gāndharva* and *Arthaśāstra*. Now the question is if Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā are included in these eighteen disciplines then how are the six philosophical schools to be counted? For Nyāya includes Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā includes both Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. Thus all the six darśanas are included in the eighteen disciplines. Then what are other darśanas? Śaṅkarācārya lists the following six –Bauddha, Śaiva, Brāhma, Saura, Vaiṣṇava and Śākta.

The origin of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy is involved in great obscurity. It is not known when and what circumstances these schools came to accept their present form but it may be supposed that before they took a particular shape with hardness and special character of their own, the ideas and views represented by them, though in wide movement had been for a long time in a floating condition. It is possible that they were subsequently assimilated and utilized by the various philosophical schools of the pre-Buddhist and Buddhist ages.

The study of Indian thought in Germany owes much or its initial momentum to Romantic nostalgia: 'For the German Romanticists, India was a symbol of their own spiritual origin and

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<sup>1</sup>. "Samyag-darśana-sampannaḥ karmabhirna nibadhyate.  
darśanena vihinastu saṃsāraṃ pratipadyate."  
Manusāṃhitā, 6/74

<sup>2</sup>. Bhagavān paramasivabhaṭṭārakah śrutyādyastādaśavidyāḥ sarvāṇi darśanāni līlayā tattadavasthā"pannaḥ prāṇiya....  
Paraśurāmakalpasūtram, 2

homeland, their own forgotten depth' [3]. Max Muller was well aware of the Romantic roots of his own Indological interest [4]. G.W.F. Hegel, the most powerful critic of Romantic nostalgia, represents a different and highly critical approach to Indian thought, yet he is a keen and watchful observer and tries to deal philosophically with Indian philosophy [5]. The general and philosophical interest in Indian thought was, however, most successfully promoted by A. Schopenhauer with the somewhat question-able effect, that it became almost automatically associated with 'idealism' on the one hand, 'pessimism' on the other hand. Inspired by Schopenhauer, P. Deussen became one of the most devoted Western students of Sanskrit and of Indian philosophy. His translations of sixty Upaniṣads and of Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* [6].

Most of the pioneering and fundamental work has been done by Indologists, such as O. Strauss (for some time co-worker of P. Deussen), G. Thibaut, R. Garbe also H. von Glasenapp, H. Jacobi, P. Hacker and with a very different approach, W. Ruben. Others like E. Hultsch, E. Windisch, F.O. Schrader, H. Oldenberg, whose main interest is in other areas of Indian studies, at least occasionally turn towards Indian philosophy. The most distinguished living representative of the study of Indian philosophy in Europe is no doubt, E. Frauwallner of Vienna. Starting around 1930, with pioneering contributions to the study of early Sāṃkhya and above all of the school of Dīnānaga and Dharmakīrti, his research covers all major fields of Indian philosophy, with the exception of Vedānta.

## 2. Background

My interest in the context of the connections between Indian and Western thought. Heilper's (IBM Research Laboratory in Haifa, Israel) interest in Indian logic was born out of a passage in the book *The World as Will and Representation* by the German philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer who was commenting on the reference by the Indologist William Jones on this matter. William Jones has the following account on the question of the relationship between Indian and Greek philosophy.

Callisthenes, a relative of the philosopher Aristotle, was the court historian to Alexander who was a member of the campaign. There exists credible evidence that Callisthenes was asked by Aristotle to bring texts to Greece. Since his bringing back of the astronomical observations of the Babylonians is attested by several sources, it is reasonable to assume that the story about his having brought back Indian logic is also credible. But this cannot be taken to mean that the texts of Indian logic directly or indirectly influenced Aristotle. Similarity in the reasoning of pre-Christian Greece and India was noted repeatedly by Al-Biruni in his book on India. The Indian system takes the material processes to be governed by laws in the ancient philosophical framework of Sāṃkhya, which takes the evolution and change in the world to be entirely materialistic while acknowledging the existence of consciousness as a separate category.

## 3. Indian thoughts

### 3.1 Broad outlook of Indian Philosophy

Indian philosophy is attractive outlook which only testifies to

its unflinching devotion to the search for truth. Though there were many different schools and their views differed sometimes very widely, yet each school took care to learn the view of all the others and did not come to any conclusion before considering thoroughly what others had to say and how their points could be met. This spirit led to the formation of a method of philosophical discussion. A philosopher had first to state the views of his opponents before he formulated his own theory. This statement of the opponent's case came to be known as the *pūrvapakṣa*. After following the refutation (*khaṇḍana*) of this view. Last of all came the statement and proof of the philosopher's own position which was known as the subsequent view (*uttarapakṣa*) or the conclusion (*siddhānta*).

### 3.2 Indian Tradition

Indian philosophies are divided into two broad classes, namely orthodox (*āstika*) and heterodox (*nāstika*). To the first group belong the six chief philosophical systems (popularly known as *ṣaḍ-darśana*), namely Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. These are regarded as orthodox (*āstika*), because they do not believe in God but they accept the authority of the Vedas. The Mīmāṃsā and the Sāṃkhya do not believe in God as the creator of the world, yet they are called orthodox (*āstika*), because they believe in the authoritativeness of the Vedas. The other classes of heterodox systems like as Cārvākas, Bauddhas and Jainas. They are called heterodox (*nāstika*) because they do not believe in the authority of the Vedas.

These six schools (orthodox) are the different complementary perspectives on reality that may be visualized as the views from the windows in the six walls of a cube within which the subject is enclosed. The base is the system of the traditional rites and ceremonies (*Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā*), and the ceiling is reality that includes the objective world and the subject (*Uttara Mīmāṃsā* or *Vedānta*), one side is analysis of linguistic particles (Nyāya), with the opposite side being the analysis of material particles (Vaiśeṣika), another side is enumerative categories in evolution at the cosmic and individual levels (Sāṃkhya) finally with the opposite side representing the synthesis of the material and cognitive systems in the experiencing individual (Yoga). Clearly, the use of systematic view of nature had been taken to a very advanced level.

Philosophy is described in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* (350 BCE) as an independent field of inquiry *ānvīkṣikī*. The epic *Mahābhārata*, which is most likely prior to 500 BCE because it is not aware of Buddhism in its long descriptions of religion, declares (*Mahabharata* 12.173.45) that *ānvīkṣikī* is equivalent to the discipline of *tarka*. Clearly, there were several equivalent terms in use in India for logic in 500 BCE.

The canonical text on the Nyāya is the *Nyāya Sūtra* of Akṣapāda Gautama. The most important early commentary on this text is the *Nyāya Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana which is estimated to belong to 5th century CE. Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana, the well-regarded authority on Indian philosophy, assigned Aksapada Gautama the date of approximately 550 BCE. He based this on the reference in the Kāṇva recension of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, in which Gautama or Gotama is shown to be contemporary of Jātukarṇya Vyāsa, who was a student of Āsurāyana. This and other evidence from the *Gṛhya Sūtras*, the *Vāyu Purāṇa*, and the Buddhist Sanskrit text the *Divyāvadāna* is summarized in the introduction of Vidyabhusana's edition of the *Nyāya Sūtra*.

<sup>3</sup>. Halbfass, W. Hegel on the Philosophy of the Hindus. In *German Scholar on India* (Varanasi 1973), p. 107-122

<sup>4</sup>. F. Max Muller, *India: What Can it Teach Us*, (London 1883), p. 29-30

<sup>5</sup>. W. Halbfass, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*

<sup>6</sup>. Upanishad's *Veda* (Leipzig 1897); *Vedānta Commentary of Śaṅkara* (Leipzig 1887)

In his History of Indian Logic, Vidyabhusana modified his views under the influence of the then current ideas of history of science and the now-discredited Aryan invasion theory. He now argued that the texts speak of two Gautamas who are both associated with logic. He declared that Medhātithi Gautama was the founder of ānvīkṣikī (550 BCE) and Akṣapāda Gautama came much later, perhaps 150 CE or so.

### 3.3 View of Gautama about Nyāya

The Nyāya also calls itself pramāṇa śāstra or the science of correct knowledge. Knowing is based on four conditions- pramā, prameya, pramātā and pramāṇa. The four pramāṇas through which correct knowledge is acquired are pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna and śabda. The function of definition in the Nyāya is to state essential nature (svarūpa) that distinguishes the object from others. Three fallacies of definition are avyāpti, ativyāpti and asambhava.

Gautama mentions that four factors are involved in direct perception- indriya, artha, sannikarṣa and jñāna. The five sense organs eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin have the five elements light, ether, earth, water and air as their field, with corresponding qualities of color, sound, smell, taste and touch. Manas or mind mediates between the self and the senses. When the manas is in contact with one sense-organ, it cannot be so with another. It is therefore said to be atomic in dimension. It is due to the nature of the mind that our experiences are essentially linear, although quick succession of impressions may give the appearance of simultaneity.

Objects have qualities which do not have existence of their own. The color and class associated with an object are secondary to the substance. According to Gautama, direct perception is inexpressible. Things are not perceived as bearing a name. The conception of an object on hearing a name is not direct perception but verbal cognition. Not all perceptions are valid. Normal perception is subject to the existence. If any of these should function improperly, the perception would be wrong. The causes of illusion may be doṣa, samprayoga or saṃskāra.

Anumāna (inference) is knowledge from the perceived about the unperceived. The relation between the two may be of three kinds; the element to be inferred may be the cause or the effect of the element perceived, or the two may be the joint effects of something else. The Nyāya syllogism is expressed in five parts: pratijñā, hetu, dṛṣṭānta, upanaya and nigamana. This recognizes that the inference derives from the knowledge of the universal relation (vyāpti) and its application to the specific case (pakṣadharmatā). There can be no inference unless there is expectation (ākāṅkṣhā) about the hypothesis which is expressed in terms of the proposition.

The minor premise (pakṣadharmatā) is a consequence of perception, whereas the major premise (vyāpti) results from induction. But the universal proposition cannot be arrived at by reasoning alone. Frequency of the observation increases the probability of the universal, but does not make it certain. Gaṅgeśa suggested that the apprehension of the universal requires alaukika pratyakṣa. The Nyāya system lays stress on antecedence in its view of causality. But both cause and effect are viewed as passing events. Cause has no meaning apart from change; when analyzed, it leads to a chain that continues without end. Causality is useful within the limits of experience, but it cannot be regarded as of absolute validity. Causality is only a form of experience. The advancement of knowledge is from upamāna or comparison, with something else already well-known. The leads we back to induction through alaukika pratyakṣa as the basis of the understanding.

Śabda is a chief source of knowledge. The meaning of words is by convention. The word might mean an individual, a form, or a type, or all three. A sentence, as a collection of words, is cognized from the trace (saṃskāra) left at the end of the sentence. Knowledge is divided into cognitions which are not reproductions of former states of consciousness (anubhava) and those which are recollections (smṛti). The Nyāya speaks of errors and fallacies arising by interfering with the process of correct reasoning. The Nyāya attacks the Buddhist idea that no knowledge is certain by pointing out that this statement itself contradicts the claim by its certainty. Whether cognitions apply to reality must be checked by determining if they lead to successful action. Pramā, or valid knowledge, leads to successful action unlike erroneous knowledge (viparyāya).

### 3.4 Aspect of Vaiśeṣika view

The Vaiśeṣika system, which deals with the analysis of nature, takes its name from viśeṣa or particularity. This system was founded by Kaṇāda. He was also named Ulūka. So the Vaiśeṣika philosophy is also known as the Kaṇāda or Aulūkyā system. Vaiśeṣika-sūtra is divided into ten adhyāyas or books, each consisting of two āhnikas or sections. Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha of Praśastapāda usually known as the Bhāṣya. Further, we know Śaṅkara's Śārīraka Bhāṣya that commentary on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra. Vyomaśiva's Vyomavati, Udayana's kiraṇāvalī and Śrīdhara's Nyāya-Kandalī are three well known and excellent commentaries on Praśastapāda's work. Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra's Sūkti and padmanābha Miśra's Setu are two less known commentaries on the same work. Vallabhācārya's Nyāya-līlāvatī and Udayana's Lakṣaṇāvalī are two valuable compendiums of Vaiśeṣika Philosophy. The later works on the Vaiśeṣika combine this system with the Nyāya. Of these Śivāditya's Saptapadārthī, Laugākṣi Bhāṣkar's Tarka-kaumudī and Viśvanatha's Bhāṣā pariccheda with its commentary Siddhānta muktāvalī are important.

Although Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were distinct systems of thought in their initial period of development, they started merging gradually because of coming closer and closer in their world-views and by the ninth century AD the merger seems to be very close. This can be drawn from the following statement of Jayantabhaṭṭa, the celebrated Kashmiri logician of the 9<sup>th</sup> century AD.

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika are allied or samānatantra systems of philosophy. They have the same end in view, namely, liberation of the individual self. According to both, ignorance is the root cause of all pain and suffering; and liberation, which consists in their absolute cessation, is to be attained through a right knowledge of reality. There is, however, some difference between the two systems on two fundamental points. While the Nyāya accepts four independent sources of knowledge, namely, perception, inference, comparison and testimony, the Vaiśeṣika recognizes only two, viz. perception and inference and reduces comparison and verbal testimony to perception and inference. Secondly, the Naiyāyikas give us a list of sixteen padārthas which, according to them, cover the whole of reality and include those accepted in the other system. The Vaiśeṣikas, on the other hand, recognize only seven padārthas and comprehend all reals under them. These seven categories of reality are dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa, samavāya and abhāva. The Vaiśeṣika philosophy is an elaboration and a critical study of these seven categories.



## 4. Western thoughts

### 4.1 Development of Western Philosophy

In the history of Western philosophy we find that as human knowledge about each of the different problems mentioned above began to grow, it became impossible for the same man to study everything about every problem. Division of specialization became necessary and a group of men devoted themselves to a particular problem or a few connected problems. There came into existence in this way the different special sciences. Physics, Chemistry, Botany, Astronomy, Geology and similar sciences took up each a part or aspect of the world of nature. Physiology, Anatomy and the other medical sciences devoted themselves to the different problems of the human body. Psychology began to study the problems of the human mind. The detailed study of many of the particular problems with which philosophical speculation originally started became thus the subject-matter of the special sciences. Philosophy then began to depend on the reports of the investigation made by the different sciences, tried to understand their meanings and implication critically and utilized these results for understanding the general nature of the universe- man, nature and God.

### 4.2 Branches of Western Philosophy

Western philosophy at the present day has for its main branches are (a) Metaphysics, which discuss the general problems regarding reality-man, nature and God, (b) Epistemology or theory of knowledge, which enquires into the nature of human knowledge, as to how it develops and how far it is able to grasp reality, (c) Logic, which discusses the laws of valid reasoning and other incidental problems, (d) Ethics, which investigates the problems of morality, such as the standard of moral judgment, the highest goal of human life and other cognate problems and (e) Aesthetics, which deals with the problems of beauty. Another recent development of philosophy in the West, called Axiology, is devoted to the discussion of the problem of values. Social Philosophy is also regarded as a branch of philosophy and often discussed along with Ethics. Psychology had been for long a very important branch of philosophy but the tendency now is to treat it as one of the special sciences like Physics and Chemistry and give it a place independent philosophy.

### 4.3 Philosophical view of Germany and Australia

The classical period of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in the 1<sup>st</sup> millennium A.D. is a period of constant conflict with Buddhist philosophy but at the same time of a remarkable interplay and mediation of ideas. This specific relationship between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist Logic has, in several exemplary cases, been accentuated by Frauwallner (an Austrian professor, a pioneer in the field of Buddhist studies) and his disciples. However, in their most recent contributions only a somewhat casual attention is paid to the classical and ancient periods of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. M. Hattori's interpretation of the role of 'non-qualificative perception' in *Prāśastapāda* <sup>7</sup> and emphasizes the ambiguity which results from the applicability of *ālocanamātra* to both the *dravya* as *qualificand* (*viśeṣya*) and its *qualifiers* (*viśeṣaṇa*). Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.5 to a passage in the *Carakasāhita* and interprets the

controversial 'trividham' as implying 'trikālam'. The legitimacy of such an interpretation is denied by A. Wezler. Wezler tries to re-interpret the 'pūrvavat', 'śeṣavat' and 'sāmānyavat' in the light of two Buddhist works, the *Upāyahrdaya* and 'Piṅgala's' commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakaśāstra*.

Some remarkable contributions to the study of Navyanyāya have recently been presented by Frauwallner. His (upādhiḥ) in Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇiḥ* gives the text a German translation and an interpretation of *Tattvacintāmaṇiḥ* (with references to the relevant passages in *Maṇikaṇṭha* and *Vardhamāna*). This chapter is an important source for our understanding of the concept of upādhi, as it had been developed in the school of Udayana <sup>8</sup>. The article Prabhākara Upādhyāya discusses the role of the Naiyāyika (not the Mīmāṃsaka) Prabhākara as a forerunner of Gaṅgeśa, with special reference to his theory of *vyāpti* and *upādhi*. Frauwallner's most remarkable contribution in this field, however, is a series of articles on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Raghunātha's explication of some passages of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (the *sāmānyābhāvaprakaraṇa* the *vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāvaprakaraṇa* and the *siddhāntalakṣaṇaprakaraṇa*) is confronted and compared with that given by his most important predecessors, such as Yājñapati, Jayadeva, Rucidatta and Vāsudeva Sārvaabhauma. Thus, Raghunātha's role and position in the development of Navyanyāya is critically examined and his achievements and his philosophical stature are subjected to some serious questions. What distinguishes him from the older group of Gaṅgeśa commentators (Yājñapati to Vāsudeva) is Frauwallner's view a rather one-sided interest in formal subtleties and in the applicability of concepts and definitions to a variety of often very remote and artificial cases.

### 4.4 Philosophy in Greece

In the West, Aristotle's theory of the syllogism has had enormous influence. At one time in Greece, Stoic logic was more influential until Aristotle's ideas became dominant and they were subsequently adopted by the Arabic and the Latin medieval traditions. The commentators grouped Aristotle's works on logic under the title *Organon* (Instrument) which comprised of *Categories* on *Interpretation*, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics* and *On Sophistical Refutations*. The central notion in Aristotle's logic is that of deduction involving premise of the argument and the conclusion. It also recognizes induction which is an argument from the particular to the universal.

In Aristotle's syllogism the primary premise is always universal and it may be positive or negative. The secondary premise may also be universal or particular so that from these premises it is possible to deduce a valid conclusion. Aristotle supposed that this scheme accurately represents the true nature of thought. If we take thought, language and reality to be isomorphic consideration of our reasoning will help us understand reality. In *Categories*, Aristotle makes a distinction among three ways in which the meaning of different uses of a predicate may be related to each other. For any such use he proposed descriptions in ten attributes: substance, quantity, quality, relative, where, when, being in a position, having, acting on and being affected by. The most important of these is substance, which is the individual thing itself. Secondary substances include the species and genera to

<sup>7</sup>. Two Types of Perception (BGI 161-169). – Classical Vaiśeṣika is a major field of research for the writer of the present survey; Galbfass, W.: Remarks on the Vaiśeṣika Concept of Sāmānya, Añjali, Papers on Indology and Buddhism. A Felicitation A. Wijesekera on his 60<sup>th</sup> birthday, ed. By J. Tilakasiri 137-150: this is followed by several forthcoming publications on related topics.

<sup>8</sup>. The text of the anonymous *Upādhidarpaṇa*, which is also very relevant in this context, still be edited by G. Oberhammer.

which the individual thing belongs. The other categories distinguish this individual substance from others of the same kind.

In Prior Analytics, Aristotle used mathematics as a model to show that knowledge must be derived from what is already known. The process of reasoning by syllogism formalizes the deduction of new truths from established principles. He offered a distinction between the non-living and the living in terms of things that move only when moved by something else and those that are capable of moving themselves. He also distinguished between the basic material and the form and purpose which jointly define the individual thing. Aristotle's logic has been the basis of theology in the West. Modern science rejects the notion of final causes. Creationism and theories of Intelligent Design are an attempt to bring in final causes into biology.

## 5. Conclusion

We find that as ānvīkṣikī Indian philosophy goes back to at least the 6th century BCE based on the textual evidence that has been universally accepted. The syllogism used in the Nyāya Sūtra has five parts, as against the three-part syllogism of Aristotle's logic. But we know that simplification of the five-part into one similar to Aristotle's was also known in India. It seems that although the Greek and Persian stories related to Kallisthenes having brought Indian logic to Greece may have a historical basis, they are not to be taken as the literal truth. At best, Indian logic provided inspiration in the sense of the need for a formal text on the subject by the Greeks. The focus in the two logical traditions is quite different, and either one is unlikely to have borrowed from the other.

The Nyāya Sūtra and Aristotle's texts are two different perspectives that tie in with the cosmologies of the two civilizations. The Nyāya Sūtra, like other Indian philosophical texts, maintains the centrality of the subject, whereas in Aristotle's logic the emphasis is on the design of the world as a machine. This also corresponds to the difference in the Indian system which considers the universe to be composed of five elements, as against the four of Aristotle. The fifth element (ākāśa) of the Indian system concerns the field of sentience. This is evidence of the interaction between India and Greece that goes back much before Aristotle. The legend that Indian logic was taken by Alexander to Greece is just the acknowledgement that Indians had a fully flowered system of logic before the time of Aristotle, who himself perhaps only reworked an earlier Greek tradition. A representative of the Marxist approach to Indian thought and culture is W. Ruben of East Berlin (Germany) accordingly he emphasizes naturalistic and materialistic trends and tries to understand the development of Indian philosophy in the context of social and economic developments. The oldest known evidence-from a palm-leaf manuscript discovered in Central Asia - for the Parvan arrangement of the Mahābhārata and for the existence of the doctrinal and philosophical parts of the Śāntiparvan.

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