



International Journal of Sanskrit Research

ॐ

ISSN: 2394-7519

IJSR 2024; 10(1): 21-24

© 2024 IJSR

www.anantaajournal.com

Received: 13-11-2023

Accepted: 17-12-2023

Kumarika Sarma

Research Scholar, Department of
Sanskrit, Gauhati University,
Assam, India

Concept of *Samavāya* (Inherence) in the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika Philosophy with Special Reference to *Saptapadārthī*

Kumarika Sarma

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22271/23947519.2024.v10.i1a.2282>

Abstract

Samavāya (Inherence) is one type of relation. It has an important role in the Indian philosophical system. *Samavāya* is an intimate relation between two things which are inseparable. Generally the relation between part and whole, universals and individuals, substance and its qualities, motion and the object in motion, eternal substance and the ultimate difference, cause and effect is called *samavāya*. It is an eternal relation which is different from *saṃyoga* or conjunction as *saṃyoga* is a separable and temporary relation. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system accepts it as an independent category. The conception of *samavāya* seems to have originated in connection with the theory of causation. The reality of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is depended on the theory of causation which is called the *Asatkāryavāda*. According to *Asatkāryavāda*, the effect does not exist in the cause, the cause and the effect e.g., threads and cloths are two separate substances, though the cloth exists in the threads by *samavāya*. These two separate substances exist in the same place for this *samavāya* relation.

Keyword: Inherence, causation, conjunction and eternity

Introduction

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika are the two ancient systems of Indian philosophy which developed separately in the early stage. Both these schools are realistic and pluralistic in their philosophical thought. There are many similarities between these two systems. Traditionally they are recognized as *samānatantra* (allied system). Hence, in course of time both these systems came closer and became amalgamated into a single as one which is designated as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and is of a syncretic nature. Many works were written on the syncretic school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. Among these works Śivāditya's *Saptapadārthī* is the earliest work of the syncretic school.

The category (*padārtha*) is the most important aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. *Padārtha* is that which is an object of cognition and which can be named (*abhidheya*). It means all objects of experience ^[1]. Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya system enumerates sixteen types of *padārthas* in his *Nyāyasūtra*. According to him, liberation can be attained by the true knowledge of these *padārthas* ^[2]. In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, Kaṇāda states that all objects of knowledge come under the six categories. These are *dravya* (substance) *guṇa* (quality), *karma* (action), *sāmānya* (generality), *viśeṣa* (particularity) and *samavāya* (inherence) ^[3]. Praśastapāda also accepts these six categories and he states that liberation depends upon the right knowledge of these six categories ^[4]. But later Vaiśeṣikas Śridhara, Udayana and Śivāditya adopt a seventh category, *abhāva* (non-existence). After Śivāditya the other writers of the syncretic school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika absorb the seven types of Vaiśeṣika categories viz., *dravya* (substance) *guṇa* (quality), *karma* (action), *sāmānya* (generality), *viśeṣa* (particularity), *samavāya* (inherence) and *abhāva* (non-existence) in their works.

In this article we would like to present a brief outline of the category of *samavāya* as we find it in some of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises.

Corresponding Author:

Kumarika Sarma

Research Scholar, Department of
Sanskrit, Gauhati University,
Assam, India

Samavāya as a Separate Category

Samavāya (inherence) is an independent category in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. It is different from other six categories viz., *dravya* (substance) *guṇa* (quality), *karma* (action), *sāmānya* (generality), *viśeṣa* (particularity), and *abhāva* (non-existence). It is the most important and the corner stone of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of Indian philosophy. *Samavāya* means when two things come to closeness together and it can be regarded as intimate union between two things which are inseparable. For example, 'cloth is white'. In this cognition, white is seen as a separate entity from the cloth in which it is remained. To unite these two components, i.e., cloth and whiteness there must be some devices. That device is conceived in the form of inherent relation which is called *samavāya*. There are three entities in the cognition of 'cloth is white'- cloth, whiteness and the relation between them. *Samavāya* makes the unity among the first five categories - *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. As a whole, *samavāya* is a unique device to make the metaphysical structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. In other word it may also be stated that when two different things inseparably connected like *dravya* and *guṇa*, *dravya* and *karma*, *dravya* and *sāmānya*, *kāraṇa* and *kārya*, *paramāṇu* and *viśeṣa* which appear as one whole or one identical inseparable (*ayutasiddha*) that is *samavāya*.

Samavāya is accepted by the Naiyāyikas as perceptible category but the Vaiśeṣikas state that *samavāya* is not perceptible, it is *atīndriya* and *anumeya* [5]. If the dravyas are perceptible then the *samavāya-sambandha* of that dravyas can be perceived. If the dravyas are not perceptible, that *sambandha* is also not perceptible. *Samavāya* has the *vādhaka*, *asāmvaṇḍhatva*. Hence, it has no genus (*jāti*). But only *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma* are related with others through the *samavāyasambandha*.

The Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas state about *samavāya*, in which two separateless dravyas are intimately connected with each other that is *samavāya*. Its eternity depends on the dravyas. If the dravyas are eternal, *samavāya* is also eternal and when the dravyas are non-eternal, it is also non-eternal. The Naiyāyikas hold that *samavāya* is eternal and one. The Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins accept *samavāya* as the relation of difference-cum-identity (*tādātmya-sambandha*) [6].

Samavāya and Causation

The knowledge of *samavāya* is gained through the connection with the relation of cause and effect. The relation of cause and effect is called the theory of causation, which is accepted by all branches of Indian philosophy and explained it according to their own views. The reality of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is depended on the theory of causation which is called *asatkāryavāda*. According to the theory of *asatkāryavāda*, the effect does not exist in the cause. The cause and the effect e.g., threads and cloth are two different substances, though the cloth exists in the threads by *samavāya* relation. These two different substances exist in the same place for this *samavāya* relation [7]. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the material cause is designated as *samavāyikāraṇa* that means the cause remains in its effect by *samavāya* relation. Thus, *samavāya* relation is the basis of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation.

According to Kaṇāda, *samavāya* is the relation which is caused between cause and effect [8]. It means that *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya* exist in their dravyas through the *samavāya* relation. It is clear that *samavāya* relation is originated because of the theory of causation. The scope of this *samavāya* relation spreads to the existence of qualities,

movement or universals in their substances. The *viśeṣa* also exists in atoms or eternal substance through this relation [9]. Though Kaṇāda includes only causalities in the relation of *samavāya*, but Prāśastapāda brings non-causal ones also under *samavāya*. According to him, *samavāya* is the relation which subsists among inseparable things which related to one another as the container and the contained and which is the basis of the idea 'this is in that' [10]. In this definition, the two entities necessarily stand in the relation of the container and the contained. That which cannot exist without the other is always the contained and the other which can exist independently is always the container. The second feature of the definition is that inherence subsists in inseparable things. It is not the relation between two entities which are capable of separate existence. A cloth remains in yarns through which it is constituted. Yarns can exist independently apart from cloth but cloth has no independent existence apart from them. The yarns are the container and the cloth is its content [11].

Samavāya and Saṃyoga

According to Śivāditya, *samavāya* is an eternal relation [12]. *Samavāya* is eternal in the sense that it cannot be produced or destroyed without producing or destroying the product. Its eternity is thus relative. *Samavāya* is eternal since all positive products are produced in their material cause by the relation of inherence and if *samavāya* is produced, it will require another *samavāya* and so on ad infinitum. Hence, in order to avoid infinite regress, *samavāya* is regarded as eternal. Just as one being inherence in many existing entities, so one *samavāya* subsists between innumerable pairs of relate. Just as being is eternal, so inherence is eternal. In *Jinavarddhanī*, a commentary of *Saptapadārthī*, it is stated that there are two types of relationship, *saṃyoga* and *samavāya*. In the definition of *samavāya* given by Śivāditya the word 'nitya' is added for *samavāya* only not *saṃyoga*. Thus it is clear that *saṃyoga* is different from *samavāya* [13].

Saṃyoga means connection of two separate things. When two substances come into contact with each other, their relation is called *saṃyoga*. This relation is not of an intimate character. It is separable. It can be destroyed at any moment by separation. According to *Saptapadārthī*, *saṃyoga* is one type of quality. It is a non-eternal relation and possesses the generality of its quality [14]. *Saṃyoga* remains in two things which can be separated. It exists between two substances like a stick and a person. *Saṃyoga* is *yutasiddha* or separable connection. *Yutasiddhi* is that relation which exists between things which are separate from each other [15]. *Saṃyoga* may be exists separately and also may be exists jointly like the relationship of book with hand [16]. Dr. Radhakrishnan says that *saṃyoga* takes place between two things of the same nature which exist disconnectedly and are for a time brought into conjunction [17].

Śivāditya says that *saṃyoga* is of two kinds- *karmaja* and *saṃyogaja* [18]. *Saṃyogaja* is the contact of thread with cloth because of the making the cloth from the contact of thread [19]. *Karmajasamāyoga* is again divided into two kinds- *anyatarakarmaja* and *ubhayakarmaja*. The example of the *anyatarakarmaja* is the conjunction of the bird with the constant tree. Though there is a conjunction of two things but only one thing has movement. Other is motionless. According to the example, only the bird moves but the tree is constant. *Ubhayakarmaja* is also the conjunction of two things which both are in motion. The *ubhayakarmaja*'s example is the conjunction of the two wrestlers or two sheep [20].

Thus, it is clear that *saṃyoga* is a separable and temporary relation. In *saṃyoga* the relata exists as unrelated to each

other before they are conjoined. It is perceptible and external relation. *Samyoga* is more than one. It is one type of quality. On the other hand, *samavāya* is a distinct category. It is different from substance, quality, action, community, particularity and non-existence. It is a relation between substance and the other categories. The things in the relation of *samavāya* cannot be separated without at least one of them being destroyed. It is a real coherence. It is not perceptible, but inferable from the inseparable connection of things. In the *Jinavarddhanī*, *samavāya* is stated as the intimate type of relation which is technically called *ayutasiddha* and it is the relation as the container and the contained. *Samavāya* is that relation which is the cause of the suffix *iha*. For example, *iha tantuṣu paṭaḥ*, *iha pātre qhr̥tam* etc.^[21] *Samavāya* is not *samyoga* because *samyoga* is the relation of two separate things. But *samavāya* is the relation of inseparable things. Śivāditya gives the definition of *ayutasiddha* that it is the relation which exists among things those are never apart from each other^[22]. It is found between the part and the whole (*avayava-avayavi*), the generic character and the individual manifestation (*jāti-vyakti*), the quality and the substance qualified (*guṇa* and *guṇī*) and the eternal substance and the ultimate difference (*nitya-viśeṣa*). A composite whole remains in its constituent part e.g., the cloth exists in yarns, through which it is composed. A generic character remains in individual e.g., *manuṣyatva* (manness) exists in all men, *ghaṭatva* (patness) exists in all ghaṭas. A quality exists in substance, e.g., colour exists in the flower. Flower is substance and colour is quality. A particularity (*viśeṣa*) exists in eternal substance.

According to Śivāditya, *samavāya* and *abhāva* are not in intimate union with anything^[23]. *Samavāya* is definitely asserted to be not in intimate relation with anything else in order to avoid infinite regress and in order to distinguish it from *samyoga*. It is that relation which does not need to be explained by a third thing^[24]. Thus, whereas *samyoga* between the hand and a book is explained by means of action, the inherent relation between the cloth and the threads is not in need of a third thing to explain their union; similarly *abhāva* also is not in intimate relation with anything else.

Samavāya is One and Eternal

According to Praśastapāda, *samavāya* is one for its similar distinguishing feature. One *samavāya* is known for all notions. One *samavāya* is related to all its relata like, substances and their qualities, substances and their actions, wholes and parts, genera and individuals, eternal substances and their particularities^[25]. Though *samavāya* is one, yet there is some restriction for the different *ādihāra* and *ādheya*. The genus of substance exists in substance. The genus of quality exists in quality. The genus of action exists in action^[26]. Praśastapāda says that if *samavāya* is one, the *samavāya* of *dravyatva*, the *samavāya* of *guṇatva* will be the same. The *guṇatva* will remain in the *guṇa* and in the *dravya* also^[27]. Then he also replies that though *dravyatva* and *gunatva* have the same *samavāya*, yet there have the different potentiality of manifestation (*vyaṅgya-vyāñjakaśakti*) on account of which there will be a restriction in the relation of the container (*ādihāra*) and the contained (*ādheya*)^[28]. Śivāditya also says that *samavāya* is one^[29]. Because it has the same distinguishing feature. There is no existence of its distinctions. One inherent can account for all notions 'this subsists in this abode.' So it is useless to assume many inferences. According to *Mitabhāṣiṇī*, *tantuṣu pataḥ* i.e. 'cloth is in threads'. In the cloth, the whiteness, movement and clothness - these all are exist. It means that *guṇa*, *karma* and

sāmānya exist in the *dravya* with the relation of *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*. These all exist in one with the relation of *samavāya*. *Tantuṣu paṭaḥ*- here *tantu* is *viśeṣana* and *paṭa* is *viśeṣya*. '*Iha śauklyam*'- here the *śuklatā* is *viśeṣya* and *iha* is *adhikaraṇa* or *ādihāra*. *Iha kuṇḍe vadarāṇi* - from this example it is found that all fruits are available in the basket, not in other. If it can be imagined the whole by one i.e. all are in one thing, then *samavāya* is also one^[30]. According to Śivāditya, *samavāya* has no production and destruction and hence it is eternal. He states that *samavāya* exists in inseparable things, which are never apart from each other. That relation is called *ayutasiddha*. It is universal.

After Śivāditya, Viśvanātha, Keśava Miśra, Annaṁbhaṭṭa etc. also give the same view on *samavāya*. Keśava Miśra also says that relation is of two kinds, *samyoga* and *samavāya*. Among them, the relation between two inseparables is *samavāya*. Other is *samyoga*^[31]. Viśvanātha defines *samavāya* that the relation of a jar etc. with its two parts etc. the relation of the substance with quality and action and relation of that generic quality with these substance, quality and action are called *samavāya*^[32]. He also states in his *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* that the eternal relation is *samavāya*^[33]. The relation which is caused between the parts and the whole, genus and the individual, quality and qualified, action and moving thing, particular and eternal substance is known as *samavāya*^[34]. He also mentions that *samavāya* can be inferred from the substance, quality and relation between them e.g., a jar is colourful, colour is a quality and the relation between the colour and the jar is *samavāya*. The jar and the colour are perceptible but the *samavāya* between them cannot be perceptible, it is inferable^[35]. Annaṁbhaṭṭa also defines *samavāya* as eternal relation^[36]. He says that *samavāya* exists in inseparable (*ayutasiddha*) pair. *Ayutasiddha* means the relation between two things as long as the parts are in the whole^[37]. According to him, the knowledge which takes the object with adjuncts like blue jar, takes the relation between the attribute and the thing possessing that attribute, as it is a knowledge of the qualified and the attribute like the attributive knowledge: a man with a stick. Such *samavāya* is proved^[38].

Form the above discussion it is clear that though Kaṇāda accepts *samavāya* as the relation which is caused between cause and effect, but the later Vaiśeṣikas like Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara, Śivāditya etc. accept it as relation which is found between inseparable entities, related as the container and the contained and cause of the latter existing in the former, e.g., a *paṭa* remains in its composite tantus. The tantus cannot be able to separate from *paṭa*. Therefore, this relation between tantus and *paṭa* is *samavāya*.

References

1. Pramitivīṣayāḥ padārthāḥ// Saptapadārthī, Uddeśakhaṇḍa, p.25
2. Pramāṇaprameyasamāśaya prayojana dṛṣṭānta siddhāntāvayava tarkanirṇaya vādajalpa vitaṇḍāhetvābhāsacchalajātiginrahasṭhānānām tattvajñānānnisreyasādhigamaḥ//Nyāyasūtra,1.1.1
3. Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 1.1.4
4. ṣaṇṇam padārthānām sādharṇyavaidharṇyatattvajñānām niḥsreyasahetuḥ// Praśastapādabhāṣya, p.6
5. samavāyasya pratyakṣa varṇanam nyāyamatenā/ vaiśeṣikamatetu samavāyo'ūndriyaḥ// Tarkakaumudī, p. 8
6. A Primer of Indian Logic, p. 33
7. The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga School, pp.376-77

8. ihedamitiyataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ samavāyaḥ// Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 7.2.26
9. The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga School, pp.376- 378
10. ayutasiddhānām.....samavāyaḥ// Praśastapādabhāṣya, p.324
11. Nyāyakandalī, p.14
12. Nityasambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ// Saptapadārthī, Lakṣaṇakhaṇḍa. p.257
13. sambandho dvāveva staḥ samyogaḥ samavāyo vā// Jinavarddhanī on Ibid., p.260
14. samyogatvasāmānyavān anityasambandhaḥ samyogaḥ// Saptapadārthī, Lakṣaṇakhaṇḍa, p. 293
15. vidyamānayoḥ sambandho yutasiddhiḥ// Ibid., Parīksākhaṇḍa, p.501
16. Jinavarddhanī on Ibid., p. 502
17. S.Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 217
18. samyogo'pi dvividhaḥ/ karmajaḥ samyogajaḥ ceti// Saptapadārthī, Uddeśakhaṇḍa, p. 124
19. tantukeśasamyogāt paṭakeśasamyogaḥ samyogajaḥ// Mītabhāṣiṇī on Ibid
20. Ibid
21. Jinavarddhanī on Saptapadārthī, Lakṣaṇakhaṇḍa. p.257
22. avidyamānayorādhārādheyayoḥ sambandho ayutasiddhiḥ// Saptapadārthī, Parīksākhaṇḍa, p. 501
23. samavāyābhāvāsamavetāveva // Ibid.,p.477
24. Jinavarddhanī on Ibid., p.478
25. sa ca dravyādibhyaḥ padārthāntaram bhāvalakṣaṇabhedāt // Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 292
26. yadyapyeka samavāyaḥ.....ādhārādheyaniyamo'sti.....dravyeṣveva dravyatvaṁ/ guṇeṣveva guṇatvaṁ karmaṣveva karmatvamiti// Praśastapādabhāṣya, p.327
27. Ibid
28. dravyatvādināmapi samavāyaikatvepi vyaṅgyavyaṅjakaśaktibhedādādhārādheyaniyama// Ibid
29. samavāyastveka eva// Saptapadārthī, Uddeśakhaṇḍa, p.51
30. Mītabhāṣiṇī on Ibid.,p.59
31. tatrāyutasiddhayoḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ/ anyayostu samyoga eva// Tarkabhāṣā, Pūrvabhāga, p.12
32. Bhāṣāpariccheda, k.10
33. samavāyatvaṁ nityasambandhatvam// Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, pp.7-8
34. Ibid., p.7
35. Ibid., p.8
36. nityasamvandhaḥ samavāyaḥ// Tarkasaṅgraha, p. 49
37. Ibid
38. Dīpikā on Ibid
39. Bhāṣāparicceda with Siddhāntamuktāvalī of Viśvanātha Nyāya Pañcānana. Ed. & Text trs. E. Roer. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press; c1850.
40. Bhattacharyya, Jotshna. Bharatiya Darsan. Guwahati: Neelgiri Mission; c1989.
41. Dasgupta SN. A History of Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1997, 1.
42. Goel, Aruna. Indian Philosophy. Green Park Extension, New Delhi: Strealing Publishers Pvt. Ltd; c1984.
43. Narain, Harsh. Evolution of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology. Varanasi: Bharati Prakashan; c1976.
44. Nyāyasūtra of Gotama. Trans. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers; c1975.
45. Praśastapādabhāṣya with Commentary Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara. Ed.Vindhyaesvari Prasad Dvivedin. Delhi: SriSatguru Publication, (2nd Ed.); c1984.
46. Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy. London:Oxford University Press; c1999, 2.
47. Saptapadārthī of Śivāditya. Ed. with Introduction, English trs. & notes by D.Gurumurti. Adyar, Madras: Theosophical Publishing House; c1932.
48. Saptapadārthī of Śivāditya with Commentaries.Ed. Tapansankar Bhattacharyya. 28/1 Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta: Sanskrit Book Dipo; c2012.
49. Sastri S, Kuppaswami. A Primer of Indian Logic. Madras: M.L.J. Press; c1930.
50. Shastri DN. The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga School. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya prakashan; c1976.
51. Sinha, Jadunath. Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Ltd, 2006(Reprint), 1999, 1.
52. Sinha, Jadunath. Outlines of Indian Philosophy. Calcutta: New Central Book Agency (P) Ltd, (Reprint); c2002.
53. Sinha KP. Nyāya-darśana-vimarśa. Calcutta-6: Sanskrit Book Dipo; c1980.
54. Tarkabhāṣā of Keśava Mīśra.Ed.S.R.Iyer.Varanasi: Chaukhambha Publishers; c2001.
55. Tarkasaṅgraha of Annambhaṭṭa with Dīpikā. Ed. K.P.Parab with Hindi trs.Anand Kumar.Delhi: New Bharatiya Book Corporation; c1999.
56. Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with Commentary of Śankara Mīśra and Extracts from the Gloss of Jayanārāyaṇa. Allahabad: The Panini Office; c1991.