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Dr. Uditā Bhattacharyya

Assistant Professor, Department
of Nyaya, K.K. Handique Govt.
Sanskrit College, Guwahati,
Assam, India

An evaluation of *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.2 in the light of Jayantabhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī*

Dr. Uditā Bhattacharyya

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Abstract

Jayantabhaṭṭa's *magnum opus Nyāyamañjarī* is considered as an independent text on Nyāya-darśana. The importance of *Nyāyamañjarī* lies in its refutation of the other philosophical doctrines. Jayantabhaṭṭa, as an ardent advocate of *Prācīna-Nyāya* tries to defend the philosophy of Gautama and Vātsyāyana. In *Nyāyamañjarī*, while discussing the general definition of *pramāṇa*, he incorporates various parallel and contextual discussions on it. In this process, Jayantabhaṭṭa even analytically criticizes his own predecessor i.e., *sūtrakāra* Gautama by commenting upon *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.2. This paper is an attempt to discuss the interpretation of Jayantabhaṭṭa on Gautama's presentation of *Nyāyasūtra* which talks of *pramāṇa*.

Keyword: Nyāyasūtra, pramāṇa, sādhanā, karaṇa, Jayantabhaṭṭa, Nyāyamañjarī

Introduction

Jayantabhaṭṭa's encyclopaedic text *Nyāyamañjarī* records Indian knowledge tradition for several centuries, i.e., from the time of Akṣapāda Gautama to his (Jayanta's) own period (till 10th c A.D.). Although, Jayantabhaṭṭa considers Buddhists as his main opponent, yet he presents the views of Mīmāṃsakas, Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Cārvāka as his opponents in various occasions. In fact, he has not left behind to critically analyse his predecessor Gautama, the founder of *Nyāyasūtra*. In *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.2, i.e., *Pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-śabdāḥ pramāṇāni*, Gautama talks of *pramāṇa* for the first time. In the *sūtra*, instead of defining the term '*pramāṇa*', he directly enumerates the names of *pramāṇa*. However, to this Jayantabhaṭṭa comments upon that, Gautama has tried to fulfil two purposes with a single aphorism^[1] and the first purpose is—it talks of the number of *pramāṇa*. Secondly, it expresses the general definition of *pramāṇa*.

Further he says that, Vātsyāyana, the commentator of *Nyāyasūtra* says that, there are three function of a *śāstra-uddeśa-lakṣaṇa-parīkṣā*.^[2] In order to have a better understanding of a *padārtha*, these three aspects are very much necessary. In *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.2, Gautama has only enumerated the names of *pramāṇas*, which is technically called *uddeśa*. However, later he has given the special definition of each *pramāṇa* (which is otherwise known as- *lakṣaṇa*) and, a thorough study of *Nyāyasūtra* reveals that, he examines each one of these *pramāṇas* separately one by one.

However, Jayantabhaṭṭa is one step ahead in this regard and he discards the objections raised by the opponents and presents his own interpretation in support of Gautama's aphorism.

He says that, the general definition of *pramāṇa* can be extracted from the etymology of the term *pramāṇa*. Though, Jayantabhaṭṭa has already discussed it in the beginning, he repeats it again^[3]. *Pramāṇa* gives the sense of *karaṇa* or *sādhanā*. The means of what is to be established- '*sādhyasādhanam*' is *pramāṇa*^[4]. This definition of *pramāṇa* is though extracted from the definition of *upamāna- prasiddha-sādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam-upamānam*^[5], but this definition goes with all the other three definitions of *pramāṇa*. For instance, in *anumiti*, one infers *sādhyā* i.e., fire (in the mountain) on the basis of *sādhanā* i.e., *vyāptijñāna*. Regarding the *karaṇa* of *anumāna*, there are two views among the logicians. Where, Jayantabhaṭṭa presents *vyāptijñāna* as the *karaṇa*, on the other hand, later Naiyāyikas accept *parāmarśa* as the *karaṇa* of *anumāna*.

Corresponding Author:

Dr. Uditā Bhattacharyya

Assistant Professor, Department
of Nyaya, K.K. Handique Govt.
Sanskrit College, Guwahati,
Assam, India

This may have set to do with their definitions of *karaṇa*, where, one sect of logicians admits the definition of *karaṇa* as— ‘*vyāpāravat asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karaṇam*’ and on the contrary, another sect of logicians admits the definition as— ‘*phalāyoga-vyavacchinnaṁ kāraṇam karaṇam*.’ According to the former group, the knowledge of *vyāpti* is the *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* or *karaṇa* of *anumiti* [6]. The knowledge of *vyāpti* is revived in the mind, when the relation between the *hetu* and *pakṣa* is known, and it leads to *anumiti*. However, according to the latter group of logicians, the knowledge of the *vyāpti* can be a *karaṇa* of inference, but it cannot immediately lead to the conclusion. For instance, in the example, ‘*parvato vahnimān, dhūmāt*’, the *hetu* i.e., *dhuma*, is known first when the knowledge of its *vyāpti* with the *sādhya* i.e., *vahni* is acquired in the kitchen. When the knowledge of the *hetu-dhūma* is known in the *pakṣa*-mountain, it (*the mountain is smoky*) is known for the second time and finally, when the property (*dharma*) of *pakṣa* (i.e., *parvata*) which is universally related to the *sādhya*, as when it is said that, ‘*the mountain is possessed of such smoke as is always related to fire*,’—it is known for the third time. It is through such *liṅgaparāmarśa*, *anumiti* occurs [7]. According to the logicians of *Navya-nyāya*, *liṅgaparāmarśa* is the *karaṇa* of *anumiti*, but, Jayantabhaṭṭa presents *vyāpti-jñāna* as the *karaṇa* or *sādhana* of *sādhya* i.e., *anumiti* in the discussion. *Anumiti* is *pramā* and *vyāptijñāna* is *pramāṇa*. In the same manner, in *pratyakṣa*, *pratyakṣa* is *pramāṇa* and *sādhya* will be seeing, listening etc. An object is perceived through the *indriyas*. Therefore, in *pratyakṣa*, *indriya* is *pramāṇa*. In case of *upamāna*, (in the example- ‘*gosadrśo gavayaḥ*’) *sādrśya* or similarity is *sādhana* and ‘*gavaya-pada-vācya*’ is *sādhya* and in case of *śabda-bodha*, *padajñāna* is *sādhana* or *pramāṇa*. So, it is well-established that, from the etymology of the term *pramāṇa*, the definition of *pramāṇa* can be taken out and this definition of *pramāṇa* is common to all the four *pramāṇas*.

With reference to the objection of the opponents that, this particular definition of *pramāṇa* also includes the means of false knowledge and will produce *smṛti*, *saṁśaya* and *viparyaya*, Jayantabhaṭṭa gives a befitting reply. He suggests that, in order to meet the anticipated difficulty three terms-*arthotpannam* (caused by an object), *avyabhicārī* (non-illusory), *vyavasāyātmakam* (determined) should be borrowed from the *sūtra* which defines perception [8].

Since, the *smṛti* is not caused by an object; therefore, the term ‘*arthotpannam*’ excludes the cause of *smṛti* from being a *pramāṇa*; similarly, the term ‘*avyabhicārī*’ set aside the cause of *viparyaya* or false knowledge and the term ‘*vyavasāyātmakam*’- which means determined or certain, prevents the cause of *saṁśaya* or doubt from being a *pramāṇa* [9]. Thus, the three terms become the common features of all the four *pramāṇas* and from a single *sūtra*- both the general definition and division of *pramāṇa* are known.

Since the *sūtrakāra* Gautama has presented two things, i.e., division and general definition of *pramāṇa* through a single *sūtra*, therefore, opponents urge that, instead of presenting it in a single *sūtra*, Gautama should use two different sentences for each of the expressions [10]; otherwise, it commits the fallacy of *vākya-bheda*. However, Jayantabhaṭṭa presents an elaborate reply to remove such a doubt—

First, he says that a *sūtra* implies many meanings, so it is called a *sūtra* [11]. Therefore, a *sūtra* is always free from this defect since, it is an agreed assumption that, *sūtra* indicates many objects through the meanings of words contained in it. Hence, even if the general definition and division is expressed by the same *sūtra*, the fallacy called *vākya-bheda* produced by

enjoining of many meanings is not a defect at all in this regard [12]. It is a skill of the *sūtrakāra* that, only with a single sentence or with a few letters many things are conveyed.

Secondly, when a matter is known only by the *śabda-pramāṇa* excluding other *pramāṇas*, the sentence which expresses it should have only one meaning. If it signifies two meanings, then the charge of the bifurcation of the single unit of thought into the two units of thoughts etc. invalidates the truth of the sentence. In such cases only, a sentence should never convey two meanings [13]. But, when the object is known by all the four *pramāṇas*, there cannot be any ‘*vākya-bheda-doṣa*’. Thus, Jayanta tries to prove the allegation of opponent as wrong.

With reference to the objection of the opponents, regarding the sequence in the presentation of *vibhāga* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, Jayantabhaṭṭa says that, there is not any hard and fast rule which determines the sequence of stating the definitions of division and general definition [14].

However, in case of *viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa*, it is quite different. It is said that, in *viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa*, a particular *pramāṇa* cannot be stated unless the division is stated [15]. Otherwise, the division and the general definition of *pramāṇa* can be put in any order as one likes, i.e., first division, then the general definition or first general definition and then the division, or both – the division and the general definition may be stated simultaneously.

In the entire discussion, Cakradhara, the commentator of *Nyāyamañjarī* without participating in the debate has remarked on a few points.

Regarding the general definition of *pramāṇa*, he agrees with Jayantabhaṭṭa and says that the expressive power of the word has the capacity to reveal its meaning. So, even though the *sūtrakāra* has not clearly mentioned the general definition of *pramāṇa*, yet one can derive it from *śabdaśakti* [16].

Again, on *vākya-bheda-doṣa*, he repeats what Jayanta has established that, if the meaning is not determined by other *pramāṇas* and the word enjoins many meanings, then only it is a fallacy. However, it is a very nature of a *sūtra* that, it implies many meanings at a time. When it is not possible to convey two meanings by using one word at a time, the same word is repeated to convey a meaning and it will be repeated and it will convey the other meaning.

Thus, in this paper it has been showed that, how Jayantabhaṭṭa is one step ahead in discarding the objections raised by the opponents and presents his own interpretation in support of Gautama’s aphorism.

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2. Nyāyamañjarī, p. 29.
3. Sāmānyalakṣaṇantu pramāṇāpadādeva samākhyā-nirvacana-sāmarthya-sahitād avagamyate. ‘Pramīyate yena tatpramāṇam-iti karaṇa-ārtha- abhidhāyinaḥ pramāṇaśabdāt pramākaraṇam pramāṇam-iti avagamyate. Nyāyamañjarī, p. 72
4. Sādhyaśādhanaśya pramākaraṇasya pramāṇatvamiti. Ibid.
5. Nyāyasūtra. I.1.6.
6. Vyāpārastu parāmarśaḥ, karaṇam vyāptidhīḥ-bhavet. Nyāya-Siddhānta-Muktavali. (Anumānakhaṇḍa) & Anumitau vyāptijñānam karaṇam parāmarśa vyāpāraḥ-anumitiḥ phalaṁ kāryam-ityarthaḥ. Nyāyabodhini, p.35. (Athalye & Bodas’ Edition of Tarkasamgraha)
7. Tasmād-liṅgaparāmarśaḥ-anumānam. Tarkasamgraha.

8. Smṛti-saṁśaya-viparyaya-janaka-vyavacchedāya pratyakṣa-sūtrād arthotpannam- iti-avyabhicāri-iti vyavasāyātmakam iti ca padatrayam-ākṛṣyate. Nyāyamañjarī, p 73.
9. Arthotpanna-padena phalaviśeṣaṇena smṛtijanakam, avyabhicāripadena viparyaya-ādhāyi, vyavasāyātmakapadena saṁśayajanakam pramāṇam vyudasyate. Ibid
10. Nanu-ekasya sūtrasya vibhāga-sāmānya-lakṣaṇa paratvena vākyabhedah. Ibid.
11. Anekārtha-sūcanādeva sūtram-ucyate. Ibid.
12. Śruti-artha-dvāraka-aneka –vastu-sūcana-śāliṣu/sūtreṣu- aneka-artha-vidher-vākyabheda na dūṣaṇam// Ibid.
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15. Ibid.
16. Samākhyāyāḥ sam-anugatāyā ākhyāyāḥ pramāṇam- ityasyā yat-nirvacanam ‘pramīyate-aneṇa’ iti vyutpattistasya yat sāmārthyam śaktiviśeṣaḥ-tat-sahitāt sāpekṣād. Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga, p.15.
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