



International Journal of Sanskrit Research

अनन्ता

ISSN: 2394-7519

IJSR 2016; 2(4): 75-81

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www.anantaajournal.com

Received: 15-05-2016

Accepted: 16-06-2016

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Anumāna as interpreted in *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* philosophy: A brief study

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Abstract

The present paper makes a mealy attempt to examine / survey the different interpretations offered by the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* philosophers on the subject of *anumāna* (inference). As regards the *Sāṃkhya* theory of knowledge, the contributions of Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Mīśra are initially examined, thereby making explicit references to their scholarly illustrations. The paper further examines the contributions of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and the *Sāṃkhya-Sūtra*, two informative documents of the *Sāṃkhya* system, to bring out the concept of *vyāpti*. Thus, referring to the deliberations of the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* logicians like Māṭhara, Gauḍapāda, Vācaspati Mīśra, Vārṣaganya, Vyāsa, and Ka ıla on the nature and function p of *vyāpti*, a contention is arrived at that no knowledge can be inferred without the knowledge of *vyāpti*. Finally, the study makes an investigation into the kinds of *anumāna* as mentioned by the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* philosophers.

Keywords: SK-*Sāṃkhyakārikā*, STK-*Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, MV-*Māṭharavṛtti*, GB- *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, SPB- *Sāṃkhyapravacana bhāṣya*, SS- *Sāṃkhyasūtra*, SSV- *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti*, SC- *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*, YB- *Yogabhāṣya*, YD- *Yuktīdīpikā*, NVT- *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā*, JM- *Jayamaṅgalā*.

Introduction

A. Definition of *Anumāna*

Indian logicians have attached much importance to *anumāna* chiefly because it is accepted as a valid source of knowledge. Every system of Indian philosophy, except *Cārvāka*, has tried to dwell on it in the light of its own metaphysical background. Showing due conformity to the vast philosophical convention of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system, the logicians in the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* system have endeavoured to deal with the subject *anumāna*, covering almost all the areas (except the fallacies of reason) touched on by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* has significantly contributed towards the formulation of the *Sāṃkhya* theory of knowledge. In this connection, the commentaries of Gauḍapada and Vācaspati Mīśra on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* deserve considerable mention. In the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, the interpretation of *anumāna* is found to have been greatly influenced by Gautama's *Nyāya-Sūtra*.

Among the sources of valid knowledge, *anumāna* is treated as the second source, the first being perception. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, most authentic work on *Sāṃkhya* logic, defines *anumāna* as the knowledge derived from sign and signate.¹ This definition of *anumāna* receives elaborate explanation in the hands of Vācaspati Mīśra whose commentaries pin-point the idea of *liṅga* (*vyāpya*) and *pūrvavat* (*vyāpaka*). Thus, in the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* system *liṅga* and *liṅgī* are synonymously used for probans and probandum respectively. He states that *liṅga* means pervaded (*vyāpya*) and *liṅgī* means pervasive (*vyāpaka*).² In other words, they may be called probans and probandum. This is because, as a rule probans should be pervaded by probandum in the process of *anumāna*. Vācaspati Mīśra states that the probans and probandum stand for inferential knowledge. The inferential knowledge arises through the knowledge that probans like smoke is pervaded and probandum like fire is pervasive.³ Vācaspati Mīśra further expresses his realisation that mere knowledge of invariable concomitance cannot lead to the

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¹prativaiśayādhyavasāyodṛṣṭam trividhamanumānamākhyātam/talliṅgaliṅgīpūrvakam āptaśrutirāptavacanantu SK,k,5

²liṅgamvyāpyam liṅgīvyāpakam STKunder SK,k,5

³dhūmādirvyāpya vahnyādirvyāpaka STKunderSK,k,5

inferential knowledge. He refers to the matter of burnt up ashes existing on the mountain which cannot be helpful in inferring fire from smoke. In the same way, the smoke existing at other places cannot lead to inferential knowledge. Therefore, it requires, in addition, application of probans on the subject or the place where probandum is inferred. The definition of *anumāna* in general can be stated thus: *anumāna* is the process which involves the cognition of invariable concomitance between the major term and the middle term and the cognition of the presence of the middle term in the minor term.

The *Sāmkhyacandrikā* also gives a different interpretation of the above statement of the *Sāmkhyakārikā*. It explains *liṅga* as probans and the *liṅgī* as probandum. The perception following probans and probandum is deliberation (*parāmarśa*). It means that the *pakṣa* is possessor of the probans which is pervaded by probandum. This deliberation is called *anumāna*. It gives rise to the *buddhivṛtti* that mountain is fiery. It is the internal mediate operation and the inferential knowledge follows it immediately.⁴

Māthara⁵ and Gauḍapāda also interpret the above statement of the *Sāmkhyakārikā*. They also establish the necessity of both probans and probandum for accomplishment of *anumāna*. But they draw further conclusion that sometimes *liṅga* leads to the knowledge of *liṅgī*, and sometimes *liṅgī* leads to the knowledge of *liṅga*. For example, in inferring cuckoo from her voice *liṅga* leads to *liṅgī*. Again in inferring her voice from the cuckoo, *liṅgī* leads to the knowledge of *liṅga*.

Sometimes *liṅga* like *tridaṇḍa* leads to the knowledge of mendicant and sometimes *liṅgī* like mendicant leads to the knowledge of *liṅga* like *tridaṇḍa*.⁶ According to the *Sāmkhya-Sūtra*, *anumāna* is the knowledge of the invariably associated (*vyāpaka*) after observing through the knowledge of invariable association⁷. *Anumāna* is the knowledge of pervade (*vyāpaka*, the major term), following the knowledge of the pervaded (*vyāpya*, the middle term), on the part of one who sees the relation of *avinābhāva* or of one not being without the other. The word *pratibandha* means pervasion (*vyāpti*) or invariable accompaniment of one thing, e.g., fire, by another thing, e.g., smoke. The knowledge of the pervade (*vyāpaka*) or what is so accompanied, which results from seeing the pervasion, is the proof called inference (*anumāna*). While *anumiti* or the result of inference, i.e., the knowledge produced by inference, is the knowledge belonging to *Puruṣa*. The *Sāmkhya-Sūtra* defines it in terms of inferential knowledge of which invariable association serves as the cause. Aniruddha, however, offers a different interpretation. He interprets *pratibandhadṛśah* as a case of a man who has been aware of the invariable association. According to him, *anumāna* is the knowledge of pervasive after knowing the pervaded in case of one who has observed the invariable concomitance between the two.⁸ Vijñānabhikṣu in his *bhāṣya* interprets the *sūtra* thus, '*anumāna* is the knowledge of the pervasive through observing the invariable concomitance.'⁹ He holds that it refers to *buddhivṛtti* as a means of knowledge.

In the system of *Yoga*, we find the definition of *anumāna* in the *Yogabhāṣya* of Vyāsa. According to Vyāsa, *anumāna* is modification of *citta* brought about by the relation which

exists in objects of homogenous nature and does not exist in the objects of heterogenous nature and ascertains chiefly the generic nature of an object.¹⁰ The modification of *buddhi* in the form of an object is the common factor to all the *pramānas*. The distinguishing factor of *anumāna* is that such a modification is caused by the knowledge of relation. According to Vyāsa, *pramāna* is defined as modification of *citta* in the form of object cognized, viz., moon and stars are moving object, and *pramā* as its false identification with *Puruṣa*. The knowledge of *sambandha* and *pratibandha* is the commonly used expression in the definitions of *anumāna* by Vārsaganya, Vyāsa and the *Sāmkhya-Sūtra* of Kapila. Here, *sambandha* means relation or invariable concomitance. We can affirm that the definition of *anumāna* in *Sāmkhya-Yoga* means the modification of *citta* brought about by invariable concomitance.

The above definitions of *anumāna* require some explanation in terms of the concept of *vyāpti* for their comprehension. *Vyāpti* is regarded as the logical ground of *anumāna*. In *anumāna*, the knowledge of the *sādhyā* or major term as related to the *pakṣa* or minor term depends on the knowledge of *vyāpti* between the middle and the major terms. In the *Sāmkhya* system, Vācaspati Mīśra's explanation of 'pervasive' and 'pervaded' gives an idea of *vyāpti*. He accepts *vyāpya* as that which is invariably and naturally associated with the nature of an object without involving some condition suspected or ascertained.¹¹ The *vyāpaka* is that with the nature of which the former is related.¹² The relation stands here for invariable association which is denoted by the term *vyāpti*. The relation of invariable association involves three things-- the two correlatives and a particular association in them. In the present case, the association should be natural and invariable. It should not be conditional. The case of relation involving condition can be explained thus-- when one infers smoke from fire, then fire would be pervaded (*liṅga*) and smoke would be pervasive (*liṅgī*). But it is generally observed that fire is not naturally related to smoke. If fire would have been invariably associated with smoke, then it would always be accompanied with smoke and would never have been found without smoke. But in some cases like iron-ball, fire exists without smoke. That is why, the association of fire with smoke involves condition. The fire requires wet fuel in addition to itself to give rise to smoke. Thus, fire does not accompany smoke naturally. On the contrary, it involves further condition of wet fuel.

In the *Sāmkhya-Sūtra*, it is stated that constant co-existence of both, i.e., the *sādhyā* and the *sādhana* or of one is called *vyāpti*.¹³ The word '*dharmaśāhityam*' means association or concomitance in being properties, in other words, going together or in co-existence. '*Ubhoyoh*', the word has been stated in respect of the case of equal pervasion (i.e., *sādhyā* and *sādhana*). And regularity (*niyata*) is cognizable by means of favourable arguments. Hence, there is no impossibility of the apprehension of *vyāpti*. The strength and validity of *anumāna* depends not only on the inclusion of all possible similar instances, but and much more on the exclusion of all possible contrary instances, which serve to establish the general proposition underlying it. *Vyāpti* cannot be a separate principle because of the necessity for the supposition of an

⁴SC,5

⁵talliṅgaliṅgīpūrvakamiti liṅgena tridaṇḍādī darśanenadrṣto api liṅgī sādhyate nunamasau parivrāḍasti yasyedam tridaṇḍamiti MV under SK,k,5

⁶liṅgena liṅgī anumiyate yathā daṇḍena yatīḥ.....liṅgīnā liṅgamanumīyate yathā drṣtvā yatimasyedam tridaṇḍamiti GB under SK,k,5

⁷pratibandhadṛśah pratibaddha jñānamanumānamSS,1.100

⁸avinābhāvadarśino vyāpyajñānādanuvyāpakajñānamanumānam. SSV,1.100

⁹vyāptidarśanād vyāpakajñānamanumānam SPB,1.100

¹⁰anumeyasya tulyajātiyesu anuvṛttāu bhinnajātiyebhya vyāvṛttaḥ sambandho yastadviśayā sāmānyāvadhāraṇa pradhāna vṛttiranumānam YB,1.7

¹¹śaṅkitasamāropitopādhinirākaraṇena vastusvabhāva pratibaddham vyāpyam STK,5

¹²yena pratibaddham tadvyāpakam *Ibid*

¹³niyatadharmasāhityamubhayorekatarasya vā vyāptiḥ SS,5.29

entity. The first part of this definition, viz., 'in case of two' refers to the case of equal pervasion which is called *samavyāpti*. The latter half, viz., 'in case of one' of them refers to the case of unequal pervasion, which is called *viṣamavyāpti*. The former is found in the case when both the *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka* are always found together without exception as that in createdness and non-eternity. The second is found in cases where the pervasion is not equal or the pervasive is more than the pervaded in pervasion just as that found in case of fire and smoke.

The *Sāṃkhya-Sūtra* contends that *vyāpti* cannot be treated as a separate category from the co-existence of properties, otherwise it would lead to the cumbrousness of postulations as it would compel to consider *vyāpti* as an independent category.¹⁴ Aniruddha states that if *vyāpti* is considered to be an independent category, then the invariable association would require separate mention. That is why it is said that invariable concomitance itself is *vyāpti*.¹⁵ According to Vijñānabhikṣu, if *vyāpti* is an additional entity to those admitted by *Sāṃkhya*, then it would lead to the acceptance of the substratum of *vyāpti* as another additional entity and it would be difficult.¹⁶ Again some Acārya opines that *vyāpti* is the result of the power of objects and as such as an additional entity.¹⁷ Aniruddha opines that *vyāpti* is the power in pervasive, e.g., fire and pervaded, e.g., 'smoke' and is observed through observing the two. Pañcaśikha opines that *vyāpti* means the relation connected with power of being maintained or sustained.¹⁸ The three technical terms of Hindu logic, viz., *vyāpya*, *vyāpaka* and *vyāpti* serve to conceptualize the whole theory of inference. The word 'vyāpya' means that which is pervaded and the word 'vyāpaka' means that which pervades and 'vyāpti' means the pervasion. Thus from the denotative view-point, in the example of fire and smoke, the denotation of fire is perceived as wholly contained within the denotation of smoke. Hence, smoke is the thing pervaded; fire is the thing pervading; and the denotation of smoke under the denotation of fire is the pervasion of smoke by fire. It is the *vyāpti* which forms the basis or principles of all inferences. It is different in different cases and the number of *vyāpti* is manifold, according to the various combinations of objects. According to the *Sāṃkhya* system, every effect must be contained in its cause before its manifestation and after unmanifestation. Therefore, the cause is having a power of sustaining the effect while the effect has got a power of being an object located (*ādharma*). *Vyāpti* or invariable concomitance is the power of being associated in the pervaded. So, Vijñānabhikṣu states that causes like *Prakṛti* are said to be pervaded and in this way *vyāpti* comes to be in possession of power of being pervaded.

In the systems of Indian philosophy, *anumāna* depends on *vyāpti* (universal relation). Now, the question naturally arises as to how such an invariable association between two objects can be ascertained. The *sāṃkhyas* ascertain *vyāpti* through perception. But Vijñānabhikṣu, the commentator on *Sāṃkhya-Sūtra* refers to *anukulatarka* as a means of ascertaining *vyāpti*. He holds *vyāpti* as invariable concomitance of reason with the consequent and refers to *anukulatarka sahaḥkṛta darśana* as the method of arriving at such a concomitance.¹⁹ According to

Vijñānabhikṣu, if one has to know the relation of smoke with fire, one perceives smoke associated with fire and tends to think that smoke is invariably associated with the fire. Again, if smoke would not have been invariably accompanied by fire, it would have been perceived without fire, but such a case is not observed. There is no possibility of rising of smoke without fire. That is why the invariableness is ascertained through such confutation.

As regards the forms of *vyāpti*, the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* system has not deliberated on the problem clearly. In the *Yoga* system, the *Yogabhāṣya* implies the division of *vyāpti* into positive invariableness which is called *anvaya vyāpti* and negative invariableness which is called *vyatireka vyāpti*. *Anumāna* is said to be caused by the relation which is found present in the similar cases and absent in the dissimilar cases.²⁰ In the case of *anvaya vyāpti*, the probans and the probandum are present in the same place. On the other hand, in the case of *vyatireka vyāpti*, the probandum is absent and the probans should also be absent. Vācaspati Miśra refers *vyatireka vyāpti* as the basis of *avāta anumāna*.²¹ In the system of *Sāṃkhya*, Vijñānabhikṣu²² and Aniruddha²³ admit two other kinds of *vyāpti*, viz., *samavyāpti* and *viṣamavyāpti*. When the probans and probandum are co-extensive or equal in pervasion then it is a case of *samavyāpti*. Both of them are never found separate, just as createdness and non-eternity. On the other hand, in *anumāna*, the probans as a rule should be pervaded by the probandum. The pervasive is one which is found at more places than the pervaded. For example, when fire is inferred through smoke, then fire is pervasive. The fire exists in more places than the smoke does. This is a case of *viṣamavyāpti*.

B. Divisions of *Anumāna*

In Indian logic, *anumāna* has been classified under different ways, viz., (i) *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, (ii) *kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyātireki* and *anvayavyātirekī*, (iii) *svārtha* and *parārtha* and (iv) *vāta* and *avāta*. In the *Sāṃkhya* system, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa divides *anumāna* into three kinds which according to its commentators refer to *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.²⁴ The *Yuktidīpikā* and *Mātharavṛtti*²⁵ imply the division into *anumāna* for its own self (*svārtha*) and that for others (*parārtha*) in their discussion of *anumāna*. The *Yuktidīpikā*²⁶ and Vācaspati Miśra²⁷ discuss the division of *anumāna* into *vāta* and *avāta*. According to Aniruddha, in addition to the above three kinds of *anumāna*, i.e., *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* there are yet three more kinds of *anumāna*, viz., *kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyātireki* and *anvayavyātireki* raising the number of kinds of *anumāna* into six.

(i) *Pūrvavat*, *Śeṣavat* and *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*

The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* takes the division of *anumāna* into three kinds as well-established which is offered by Gautama in his *Nyāya-Sūtra*. Vātsyāyana, in his *Nyāyabhāṣya*, offers two alternate explanations of the nature of *pūrvavat anumāna*. With regard to this classification of *anumāna*, the *Sāṃkhya* adopts the *Nyāya* view.

¹⁴na tattvāntaram vastukalpanā prasakteḥ SS,5.30

¹⁵tattvāntarasvīkāre apyavyabhicāro vaktavyaḥ SSV,5.30

¹⁶nīyatadharmaśāhityātirikta vyāptirna bhavati vyāptitvāśrayasya vastuno'pi kalpanāprasāṅgāt SPB,5.30

¹⁷nījaśaktyudbhavamityācāryāḥ SS,5.31

¹⁸ādheyaśaktiyoga iti pañcaśikhaḥ SS,5.32

¹⁹nīyamaśācānukulatarkena grāhya itī na vyāptigrahāsambhava itī bhāvaḥ SPB,5.29

²⁰VB,1.7

²¹STK,5

²²ubhoyoriti samavyāptipakṣeproktam SPB,5.29

²³ubhoyoriti samavyāptikayoḥ....viṣamavyāptikasya SSV,5.29

²⁴trividhamanumānamākhyātām SK,k.5

²⁵MV,5

²⁶tatra proyogamātrabhedāt dvaividhyam vītaḥ avītaḥ itī YDunderSK,5

²⁷tābadvividham vītamavītaṇca STKunderSK,5

A *pūrvavat anumāna* means an effect that is inferred from its cause. A *pūrvavat anumāna* is that inference which infers an object belonging to the class of objects perceived, e.g., the inference of fire by means of smoke, since objects of the class of fire have been perceived before in the kitchen room and other places. A *śeṣavat anumāna* means the condition in which the cause is inferred from its effect. Again, a *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* is illustrated as the perception of something at some other place caused by movement, e.g. the sun is perceived at different places. Therefore, it is inferred that there is movement of the sun, though it is imperceptible. According to *Yuktidīpikā*, the term ‘*pūrva*’ means cause and ‘*pūrvavat*’ means that which has cause as a probans.²⁸ It means the *anumāna* in case of which after observing the cause one comes to know the future effect. For example, one infers future rains after observing rise of cloud in the sky.²⁹ The *Yuktidīpikā*, however, realizes the difficulty involved in the above example. The valid probans by its very nature should necessarily lead to the probandum failing which the probans ceases to be a probans. But, the above example lacks in the above condition and hence ceases to be a proper example. According to the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, the rise of cloud in the sky is not necessarily the cause of rains. We cannot establish invariable relation between rise of clouds and rains, because there is the possibility of obstruction by wind and the rest.³⁰ The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* opines that in that case, the definition of *pūrvavat anumāna* should be understood as that – through which observing the causal power seized amongst the assisting powers free from obstructing elements, one comes to know future rise of effect just as after observing the clay possessed by the potter who is active and having the instruments like the iron rod and the rest, one comes to know the future manifestation of a pot. In the view of Māthara and Vijñābhikṣu, *pūrvavat anumāna* is based upon past experience. They explain *pūrvavat* as it was observed earlier.³¹ For example, one infers rains after observing rise of clouds in the sky. The *Jayamaṅgalā*, the *Sāmkhyacandrikā* and Gaudapāda follow the expositions of *Yuktidīpikā*. They explain *pūrvavat* as the *anumāna* which has cause as the probans. A *śeṣavat anumāna* is various as understood in three ways, viz., (i) from effect to cause, (ii) from one part to the rest and (iii) through elimination. According to the *Yuktidīpikā*, a *śeṣavat anumāna* is defined as that in which after observing the accomplishment of effect one comes to know the prior existence of its cause. As for example, one comes to know the meeting of the couple after seeing a boy. The *Yuktidīpikā*, however, tends to contend that such a reasoning is also not free from fault. There is no invariable concomitance between meeting of the couple and birth of a boy. The birth of a boy does not necessarily lead to the knowledge of meeting of the couple. The birth of Droṇa, etc. is heard to be without the meeting of the couple.³² For this reason the probans is non-conclusive and that is why the example is rejected by the *Yuktidīpikā*. It records another example as after seeing the sky red, one comes to know the rise of the moon or the sun. This is also not a faultless example. Therefore, the *Yuktidīpikā* gives a faultless example.

²⁸tatra pūrvavat yadā kāraṇamavyuditam dṛṣṭvā bhaviṣyattvam kāryasya pratipadyate YD,5

²⁹tad yathāmeghodaye bhaviṣyattvam bṛṣṭeḥ *Ibid*

³⁰YD,5

³¹MV,5

³²nahi dayasamāpatipūrvaka eva prāṇabhṛtaṃ prādurbhāvaḥ, droṇādīnāmanyathopattiviśeṣāsravanāt, YD,5

As after seeing the leaf one comes to know the root of water lily or after seeing the sprout one comes to know the seed.³³

The second interpretation of *śeṣavat anumāna* mentioned above is given by Māthara³⁴ and Gaudapāda.³⁵ It is exemplified by the mas after finding a drop of water from the sea to be saltish, one infers that the rest of water is also saltish. Vijñānabhikṣu gives the third of the above mentioned interpretations. Vācaspati Miśra follows Vijñānabhikṣu and gives the third interpretation. According to him, *śeṣavat anumāna* is the knowledge with reference to the residual after eliminating the undesirably involved objects when there remains no undesirable involvement of something else.³⁶ *Śeṣavat* means that which has *śeṣa* or an object not known before as its subject matter. In other words, it is the inference (*sādhyā*) which does not belong to the class of any known object. For example, the inference of the difference of earth from all other things by means of earthiness.

In the *Sāmkhya-Sūtra*, it is stated that a *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* is the proof of both *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*.³⁷ A *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is that inference which is neither *pūrvavat* nor *śeṣavat*. It is from where the apprehension of the *vyāpti* or pervasion, by generalization (*sāmānyataḥ*) from the cases of object belonging to perceptible classes, etc., an object of a different class, i.e., an imperceptible object etc., is established by the force of the mark of inference being a property of the subject of the inference. The *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* is understood in two ways- (a) based upon analogy and (b) inferring a characteristic in other cases after observing it in one case. Some of the commentators of the *Sāmkhyakārikā* have given both of these interpretations. But some commentators give one of them. In *Mātharavṛtti*, Māthara gives the second interpretation. He exemplifies it thus that observing the mango tree having flower, one infers the flowers on the other trees as well.³⁸ Gaudapāda gives both of the above interpretations in his *bhāṣya*. For the first interpretation, he gives the example as follows-

“The moon and stars have movement because they change the place. Whatever changes the place, has movement just as *Caitra*. The moon and stars change the place. Therefore, they have movement”.³⁹ The *Jayamaṅgalā* also gives the same example. For the latter interpretation, Gaudapāda gives the same example given by Māthara. The *Yuktidīpikā* discusses the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* type of *anumāna* elaborately. According to it, *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is defined as that after observing the invariable concomitance of the two objects one comes to know the invariable association of the objects of the same group at some other place at some other time.⁴⁰ For example, some times after observing the relation of smoke and fire, one comes to know at other time the existence of some other fire through some other smoke.⁴¹ The *Yuktidīpikā* opines that the above factor is common to the other kinds of *anumāna* also. Therefore, it cannot serve as a distinguishing feature of *anumāna* based on general observation. That is why the *Yuktidīpikā* gives another explanation of *anumāna* based on

³³parṇam dṛṣṭvā śālukam pratipadyate ankuram vā dṛṣṭvā vījam iti tadā śeṣavat YD under SK,k,5

³⁴samudrodakavindum prāsyā śeṣasya lavaṇabhāva anumiyate iti śeṣavat MV under SK,k,5

³⁵samudrādekam jalavalam lavaṇamāsādyā śeṣasyāpyasti GB under SK,k,5

³⁶śiṣyate pariśiṣyate iti śeṣaḥ sa eva viśayatayā yasyāstyanumānājñānasya taccheṣavat STK,5

³⁷sāmānyatodṛṣṭāt ubhayāsiddhiḥ SPS,1.103

³⁸puṣpitāmradarāsanāt anyatra puṣpita āmarāḥ iti MV,5

³⁹deśāntarāddeśāntaram dṛṣṭam gatimaccandratārakam,caitra GB,5

⁴⁰sāmānyatodṛṣṭam yatra arthayorvyābhicāramupalabhya deśāntarekālāntare ca tajjīyāyayoravyābhicāram pratipadyate YD,5

⁴¹*Ibid*

general observation. After observing the invariable association of some, observing on some later occasion one characteristic out of those, there arises the knowledge of some other unobserved characteristic in some dissimilar object. As for example, on observing Devadatta's attaining to some different place through movement, the movement is inferred in case of the invisible planets through their attaining to some different place. Similarly, on observing that the length in case of castle etc. is caused by growth, the growth is inferred in case of the medicinal herbs and trees by observing their length. The *Yuktidīpikā* is aware of the difficulty involved in this explanation also. It can very well be a case of *śeṣavat* type of *anumāna* because the movement and growth are the effects of attaining to some other place and length respectively through which they are inferred. The *Yuktidīpikā* alleviates the above difficulty on the ground that in case of *śeṣavat anumāna* there is necessity of the knowledge of cause from effect. But this is not a condition for an *anumāna* based on general observation.

(ii) *Kevalānvayi, Kevalavyatireki and Anvayavyatireki*

In the *Sāṃkhya* system, Aniruddha mentions these three kinds of *anumāna*, viz., *kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyatireki* and *anvayavyatireki*⁴². But he does not discuss them elaborately. Actually, these divisions are introduced by Uddyotakara on the basis of the nature of *vyāpti*. In the *kevalānvayi anumāna*, *vyāpti* is affirmative only and there is no possibility of counter example. In the *kevalavyatireki anumāna*, *vyāpti* can be stated in negative forms and there is no possibility of any homogenous example. Again, in the *anvayavyatireki anumāna*, *vyāpti* is stated in both positive and negative forms. The *kevalānvayi anumāna* is exemplified as that sound is non eternal, because it is produced'. The *kevalavyatireki anumāna* is exemplified as – 'the living body is not devoid of a soul, because then it would be devoid of life.' The third, i.e., *anvayavyatireki anumāna* is exemplified as the inference of fire through smoke. Here, both the homogenous and the counter examples are possible.

(iii) *Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna*

In the *Sāṃkhya* system, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* does not refer to such a division of these kinds of *anumāna*. The *Yuktidīpikā* and *Mātharavṛtti* seem to imply such a division in their interpretation of *anumāna*. In the view of *Yuktidīpikā*, the five components of *anumāna*, viz., proposition (*pratijñā*) reason (*hetu*) exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) are meant for making someone else known. The implication here is that these are not necessary for knowing the things oneself. The *Yuktidīpikā* is not very strict in matters of using these components in making the others known. These components are to be used in accordance with the necessity of the party that enquires about the object. According to Māthara, one establishes the object for knowledge of others through the use of five components of *anumāna*. This is called *parārthānumāna*. Māthara considers three components of an *anumāna*, viz., *pakṣa*, *hetu* and *drṣṭānta*. Here, *pakṣa* is called *pratijñā* and *drṣṭānta* is called *nidarśana*. For example, *Vahnimānyam pradeśaḥ (pakṣa); dhūmavāt (hetu);* and *Yathā mahānasam (drṣṭāntaornidarśana)*.⁴³ Some scholars arrive at an opinion from such remarks that for the *svārthānumāna* one uses the

three components of *anumāna*. According to Māthara, both the sets of components are to be used in formal *anumāna* for making the others known. There is no need of formal use of these components in *anumāna* for knowing the thing for one's own self (*svārthānumāna*).

(iv) *Vīta and Avīta anumāna*

Following the *Sāṃkhya* tradition, Vācaspati Mīśra classifies the *anumāna* into two kinds, viz., '*vīta*' and '*avīta*'. The division into *vīta* and *avīta* is attached much importance in the *Sāṃkhya* texts, more especially the *Yuktidīpikā* which describes the nature of these varieties in detail. The *vīta anumāna* means that which functions through an affirmation.⁴⁴ Again, the *avīta anumāna* means that which functions through negation.⁴⁵ of these two, '*avīta*' is called *śeṣavat anumāna*. *Śeṣavat anumāna* is that in which some of the likely properties of an object are denied and eliminated, the likelihood of their belonging to some others being also denied. We have cognition of that which remains. This kind of *anumāna* is found in establishing *śabda* as a *guṇa*. It is through certain grounds that *śabda* can be shown as distinct from other objects. When such distinctive grounds are eliminated, there remains a ground by which *śabda* can be shown as a *guṇa*. Since we proceed with the *anumāna* on a ground that remains, other grounds being eliminated, this inferential process is known as '*śeṣavat*'. Vācaspati Mīśra further gives the example of *avīta anumāna* as – "Cloth is not different from threads, because it is a quality of them, whatever differs from something can not be a quality of that, just as the cow cannot be a quality of the horse, this is however not a case with the cloth, therefore, cloth is not different from threads."⁴⁶ The *vīta anumāna* is of two kinds, viz., the *pūrvavat anumāna* and the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna*. Of these, the *pūrvavat anumāna* has for its object that universal of which a specific individual has been perceived. The term '*pūrvavat*' means well-known. It is that inferential cognition of which such a universal in the object is called '*pūrvavat*'. For example – when from the presence of smoke we infer the presence of fire in general in the hill, this in general is one, of which a specific individual in the shape of a particular fire has been previously perceived in the kitchen⁴⁷. The second form of *vīta anumāna* is *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* which is the general cognition having for its object a general instance of which a specific instance has not been perceived.⁴⁸ As for example, when we have an inferential cognition of the sense organ, how could we know about the existence of the eye? For every action to take place there should be an instrument. Seeing is an action. Therefore, we have to infer the eye as a means to the action of seeing. This is *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna*. In the term, '*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*', '*drṣṭa*' stands for '*darśana*', cognition and '*sāmānyataḥ*' stands for '*sāmānyasya*' of the universal, the affix '*taḥ*' being capable of signifying the sense of all case endings. Thus, the term '*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*' *anumāna* stands for the *anumāna*, inferential cognition of that particular 'universal' of which a specific individual has not been perceived.

The *Yuktidīpikā* states that *anumāna* is of two kinds, viz., *vīta* and *avīta*. Both of these kinds are meant for explaining something for others. In the view of *Yuktidīpikā*, the *vīta* is

⁴⁴anvayamukhena pravartamānam vidhāyakam vītam STK,p.51

⁴⁵vyatirekamukhena pravartamānam niśedhakam avītam Ibid

⁴⁶STK,9

⁴⁷yathā dhūmāt vahnitva sāmānya viśeṣaḥ parvate anumīyate tasya vahnitva sāmānyaviśeṣasya svalakṣṇam vahniviśeṣaḥ drṣṭaḥ rasavatyaṁ STK,p.53

⁴⁸sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṁ adṛṣṭasvalakṣṇa sāmānyaviśayam Ibid

⁴²anenānvayi,vyatireki,anvayavyatireki,pūrvavat,śeṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṇca saṁgrhitam SSV,1.100

⁴³trīsādhānam trayavyavaya pañcācā trayavyavayapare. pakṣahetudṛṣṭānta itī trayavyavayam MV,5

that when the probans is applied in its very form. Again, the *avīta* is through elimination when other possibilities are eliminated. The further explanation offered by the *Yuktidīpikā* brings out the difference between the *vīta* and *avīta* more clearly. It states that the essential form of probans can be of two types, viz., generic and particular. In the case of *vīta anumāna* the probans is employed in its essential form without any reference to the exclusion of other's stand. In the case of *avīta anumāna*, the probans does not prove the probandum directly but wards off other possible alternatives. It is employed to prove something through elimination. According to *Yuktidīpikā*, if the *vīta* yields particular results without the need of eliminating other possibilities, the *vīta* alone is sufficient. If, however, there is the need of eliminating other possibilities, the *avīta* is resorted to for the purpose. That also runs in the way of an argument as, 'if it is not admitted so, there arises the undesirable contingency of admitting some other undesirable involved object'. If the elimination of undesirably involved object is not intended, there is no need of *avīta*. For example, past rains are inferred through flood in river as the cause of the latter. But it involves an undesirable contingency of possibility of considering melting of snow, break of bridge and sports of elephants as the cause of flood. The possibility of these are warded off through *avīta* as these are negated through the probans like space, time etc. For example, it is negated through the place as there is no Himalaya in south, and through time as it is the rainy season which leads to acceptance that it should be rainy water. The *Yuktidīpikā* seems to hold that the *avīta* is for confirming the *vīta* but not an independent type of probans. Thus the existence of the cause of universe is inferred through *vīta* type of *anumāna*, but it is established through *avīta* that it can be *pradhāna* only. The *Yuktidīpikā* explicitly states that probans is of two types, viz., *vīta* and *avīta*. The former is subdivided into five.⁴⁹ The *vīta* is again said to be containing ten components, viz., inquisitiveness, doubt, purpose, conjecturing, to throw aside the doubt, proposition, probans, example, application and conclusion. It is, however, not clear as to how many kinds and components an *avīta* would have. The illustrations of application of *avīta*, however, are found in the context of *śeṣavat* type of *anumāna*. Hence, it should not be misunderstood that the probans of *anumāna* based on analogy only are divided into *vīta* and *avīta*. This makes it clear that *avīta* is only an assisting factor for *anumāna*. According to *Yuktidīpikā*, the *vīta anumāna* should be used first, because otherwise the definition of *avīta* would be contradicted. The nature of *avīta* is to assist establishing of a particular thing through elimination of other possible alternatives. If the elimination is warded first and then the establishment of the thesis, it would go against the purpose of *avīta*.

The division of *anumāna* into seven kinds is also attributed to the Sāṃkhya. But Vācaspati Mīśra attacks the Sāṃkhya view that speaks of seven kinds *anumāna*.⁵⁰ Vācaspati Mīśra states that the Sāṃkhyas divide *anumāna* into seven kinds on the basis of sevenfold inferential marks in the relation in *vyāpti*. These seven kinds of relation are as follows:

(i) measurement, (ii) cause, (iii) contact, (iv) opposition, (v) association, (vi) master and servant, and (vii) killer and the killed.⁵¹

Vācaspati Mīśra contends against the view of the Sāṃkhya by stating that it is illogical to postulate these relations in *vyāpti*.

The theory of Sāṃkhya does not account for the temporal factor as for instance, in the case of opposition. The rain is said to be opposed to the contact of cloud with wind. The past rain, however, is not opposed to the future contact of cloud with wind. On the contrary, the past rain is favourable to the future contact of these two. The future rain is also not opposed to the past contact of cloud with wind. Hence, the opposition cannot serve as an inferential mark or the relation in *vyāpti*.

In the available texts of Sāṃkhya, the seven inferential marks and their relations in *vyāpti* are not found mentioned. The *Jayamaṅgalā*, however, refers to seven kinds of relation in *vyāpti*. But, these are not same as recorded by Vācaspati Mīśra. The relations like those of master and servant, association, opposition and cause and effect are common to both. Instead of measurement, contact and killer and killed, the *Jayamaṅgalā* mentions the modification and its source, pot and its possessor, and the object and the being for which it is meant. The *Jayamaṅgalā* and Vācaspati Mīśra have recorded these seven kinds of relation in *vyāpti* from some ancient texts which have been lost to us. Vācaspati Mīśra enumerates these varieties of relation in *vyāpti* but does not illustrate them from which it is possible to deduce a few possibilities. Firstly, forms of *vyāpti* are those which cannot be favourably applied to the basic Sāṃkhya assumption. As for instance, the *prakṛtivikāra* or the *nimiṭṭa-naimiṭṭika* etc.

C. Fallacies in Anumāna

No extant text of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga discusses the fallacies in *anumāna*. The *Mātharavṛtti* makes reference to them without making any explicit explanation on them. It states that there are thirty three fallacies of *anumāna*. Out of them nine like contradiction by perception, etc, refer to the fallacies of *pakṣa*; fourteen like unproved (*asiddha*), non- conclusive (*anekāntika*) and contradictory (*viruddha*) etc. are the fallacies of probans, and ten are the fallacies of example. The subject of fallacies in *anumāna* might have been referred to in the earlier texts of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system but their unavailability has rendered the matter hazy. Again, the extant texts of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system are silent over the issue of fallacies in *anumāna*. The statement of *Mātharavṛtti* that *anumāna* has thirty three fallacies, is without explanation and therefore bears little significance.

To sum up, thus having attempted to examine the view-points of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers in interpretation of their definitions of *anumāna* and also the detailed and systematic classifications of *anumāna*, we can safely arrive at the contention that the vast convention of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy agrees in espousing the view that *anumāna* is a process of arriving at truth not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of *vyāpti* or an invariable concomitance between two things, e.g., smoke and fire.

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⁴⁹YD,6('Sāmkhya-Yoga Epistemology', p.158)

⁵⁰NVT,1.1.5('Sāmkhya-Yoga Epistemology', p.146)

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